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One could say that we live in the molecular age. The biological
and biomedical sciences, the geosciences, medicine and
psychology, among others, have all been moving towards a
molecular description and understanding of the phenomena they
study. In this respect chemistry, and in particular major parts of
organic chemistry, play a key role in understanding the living
world, as it was here that the foundations of molecular thinking
were established.
Despite its huge intellectual and practical impact on other scien-
tific disciplines chemistry is hardly a topic of interest in other
academic arenas. It is even largely neglected by philosophers
who professionally study the sciences. About a century ago, for
example, philosophers vividly debated the natural sciences,
fostered by the golden age of theoretical physics. Among the
most visible protagonists were the representatives of the Vienna
and Berlin Circles, such as Moritz Schlick (1882–1936), Rudolf
Carnap (1891–1970), and Hans Reichenbach (1891–1953), as
well as Karl Popper (1902–1994). Despite the fact that these
times of philosophical discussion were also golden ones for
chemistry and its largest field, organic chemistry, chemistry was
hardly addressed in these debates [1,2]. To some extent this had
to do with the focus of these philosophers on physics as the
paradigmatic example of science, i.e., a role model for what
science is (for example: thoroughly mathematical and centered
on laws of nature). In addition, an important consideration was
that chemistry could perhaps be reduced to physics, and chem-
ical phenomena could completely be described in terms of
quantum mechanics. On such a view, chemistry would at best
be a non-autonomous, applied science that depends for its
explanatory content on the laws of more fundamental sciences
(a view that is also voiced by some contemporary philosophers
with respect to biology, see [3]).
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), the great German philosopher,
too, considered chemistry not to be a proper science, albeit for
different reasons. For Kant, the laws of chemistry were
“merely” empirical and could not aspire to the status of neces-
sary truths. As Kant argued in his Metaphysical Foundations of
Natural Science (1786), only disciplines that have a foundation
in mathematics and therefore are able to formulate necessary
truths on the basis of a priori principles should be counted as
proper sciences. Mechanics, for example, was a proper science.
Chemistry, in contrast, for Kant was improperly called science,
that is, he considered it to be not a science at all but rather a
“systematic art” [4]. Note, though, that the qualification of
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chemistry as a systematic art was not meant as a disqualifier:
Systematic arts for Kant were experimental doctrines, that is,
the empirical investigation of natural phenomena guided by
reason “where we begin by the observable large-scale prop-
erties of matter and then attempt to determine its internal struc-
ture “from the outside in”” [5]. While this is what today we
would call empirical science [6] or applied or practical science
[2], the important point is that such investigations do not yield
(certain, necessary, a priori) laws of nature, but “merely” empir-
ical descriptions of the phenomena that, according to Kant, to
constitute scientific knowledge must be embedded in the system
of a priori laws of nature that the proper sciences could yield
[2,6].
In practice it may be of little importance whether philosophers
regard chemistry to be a “proper” science or something else,
such as an applied science or a domain of technology. Still, the
character of chemistry plays an important role in determining
how chemistry is, and could be, related to other disciplines.
Linus Pauling (1901–1994), for example, argued that chemistry
could play an integrative role in the domain of science and tech-
nology, as chemistry was more general than other disciplines
and studied a much wider area of phenomena. As Pauling
stressed: “Physicists in general tend to restrict themselves to the
small part of the physical world with which they deal, and to
leave out of their studies all such features as the structure, and
properties of substances in relation to their chemical composi-
tion, and the reactions that change one substance into another”
[7]. The integrative role that Pauling envisaged for chemistry
allocates the field a central and fundamental place among the
sciences, which seems difficult to combine with a status of
chemistry as applied science or technology. In the philosophy of
science the question what kind of enterprise chemistry is, is
increasingly coming into focus these days, in part due to the fact
that over the past one or two decades the philosophy of chem-
istry has increasingly established itself as a clearly visible area
of investigation [1,2,8]. In addition, this interest is linked to the
rapidly emerging molecular bio- and life sciences and their
impact on our societies and on the individual. The question
what is “proper” science now is also debated in new areas of the
biosciences, such as synthetic biology, of which it is claimed
that it represents the transformation of biology to technology or
to engineering.
So, can chemistry and in particular organic chemistry be
thought of as a “proper” science (where the notion of “proper
science” still needs to be clarified), or should it be seen as a
different sort of discipline, such as an applied science or a tech-
nological discipline? We will address this question from a
number of perspectives connected to traditional lines of discus-
sion in the philosophy of science and technology. Our aim is to
highlight some perspectives from which the issue could nowa-
days be approached and to bring the issue to the attention of the
community of chemists.
First, there is the question what science is, i.e., how science is
best characterized. This may seem easy enough to answer: We
usually recognize science when we see it. Upon a closer look,
however, the question poses curiously difficult problems.
Philosophers of science have traditionally tried to answer it by
formulating a so-called demarcation criterion that would allow
us to distinguish between “good” or “proper” science and non-
scientific areas of work, such as pseudo-sciences (fields that
pretend to be scientific but in fact are not; think of Intelligent
Design) and non-sciences (fields that do not claim to be
sciences in any strict sense while still being legitimate areas of
work; think of the humanities, but also of the engineering disci-
plines). The question whether a particular field of work is a
science or perhaps rather a technological discipline can thus be
conceived of as asking for the application of a demarcation
criterion that distinguishes the sciences from other academic
fields, including technology. Would this be a promising
endeavor?
A famous example of a demarcation criterion is Karl Popper’s
notion of falsifiability, according to which those areas of work
are scientific that produce statements that can be tested and
refuted [9]. Popper’s thoughts on science were strongly
influenced by the theoretical developments in physics in the
early 20th century, especially the rise of general relativity
theory and quantum physics. These new theoretical proposals
could only survive if well-designed experiments would not
falsify them. Even though chemistry is more like an applied
science and often relies on models rather than on pure theories,
one can envision fundamental theories that would fall under
Popper’s narrow definition that can only or principally be falsi-
fied by organic chemists. Some examples of topics in which
falsification could play a role located at the interface to the
biosciences are:
1. the origin of organic molecules on earth and what is
called prebiotic chemistry [10,11];
2. the origin of chirality in bio(macro)molecules and thus in
life [12];
3. the question why biomolecules on earth are based on
carbon backbones and not on silicon;
4. the question whether one could imagine other forms of
molecular architectures that make up self-repeating
systems that develop under evolutionary conditions
(molecular recognition, self-assembly and dynamic
combinatorial chemistry) and how their molecular com-
position would be;
Beilstein J. Org. Chem. 2015, 11, 893–896.
895
5. the question why nature developed DNA and RNA that
utilize ribose and 2-deoxyribose as central nucleotide
building blocks instead of the more abundant and readily
available glucose [13].
For various reasons, however, falsifiability failed as a demarca-
tion criterion. For example, it fails to describe how science actu-
ally works: Whether or not a particular hypothesis or theory is
falsifiable is often far from straightforward, scientists often
endorse non-falsifiable hypotheses and theories, and falsified
hypotheses and theories often continue to be endorsed, as scien-
tists have good reasons not to abandon them. Conversely, many
claims that clearly do not belong into the scientific domain are
falsifiable: consider explanations of events in everyday
contexts. Since the failure of Popper’s attempt, philosophers of
science have not been able to come up with a suitable alter-
native criterion and have largely given up on the project of
distinguishing “good” science from other academic disciplines
and from pseudo-science (but for a renewed interest in the
issue, see [14]). It seems, then, that the question to focus on
should not be what demarcates science from other areas of
work.
An alternative approach considers the possible reduction of
theories or entire sciences to more fundamental theories or
sciences. While there are numerous models of reduction in the
philosophy of science [15], a classic model is due to Ernest
Nagel [16]. According to Nagel, the “reduction of one science
to another” [16] involves connecting the concepts of both
sciences by means of so-called bridge laws, and the derivation
of the laws and theories of the reduced science from those of the
more fundamental science. A well-known example is the reduc-
tion of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics [15,17], in
which a bridge law would identify temperature with the mean
kinetic energy of the constituent molecules of a gas. The
science that is reduced is then explained by the science to which
it is reduced, that is, the more fundamental science explains
why the laws and theories of the less fundamental science hold
[16]. As the “real” explanatory work is thus done at a more
fundamental level, it might seem that the reduced science loses
some of its scientific status. For chemistry this notion of reduc-
tion might have diverging implications. On the one hand, one
might think that it should be possible to reduce many “molecu-
larized” fields to chemistry, providing chemistry with the status
of a comparatively fundamental field. On the other hand, one
might think that chemistry could itself be reducible to a more
fundamental science.
The question whether a particular field of work is science or
should rather be seen as, for example, technology may thus be
understood as the question whether the field has its own proper
explanations, or accounts for phenomena by using explanations
from other sciences located at a more fundamental level. On
such an understanding, applied disciplines are not “really”
explanatory, as their aim is not to explain the phenomena under
study but rather to control them. Such a view can be found with
philosopher of science Mario Bunge, who was among the first
philosophers to address the question what makes a particular
area of work into a science or a technological discipline, and
what might be the relevant factors distinguishing science from
technology. Bunge [18] distinguished between “pure” and
“applied science”. According to Bunge, the distinction between
the two has to do with the aims that are being pursued: “The
method and the theories of science can be applied either to
increasing our knowledge of the external and the internal reality
or to enhancing our welfare and power. If the goal is purely
cognitive, pure science is obtained; if primarily practical,
applied science. […] [W]hereas the former wants to understand
things better, the latter wishes to improve our mastery over
them” [18]. An example of applied science in this sense would
be cancer research, as it has a decidedly practical aim, namely
curing cancer, rather than finding the laws of nature that govern
cell growth.
With respect to organic chemistry, the relevant questions would
thus be: Can the theories of organic chemistry be reduced to
those of more fundamental sciences? Does organic chemistry
have its own proper explanations? And does organic chemistry
have a cognitive, explanatory aim, or rather a practical, applica-
tory aim (or perhaps both)? Note that answers to which extent
organic chemistry does not have its own explanations, and has a
practical rather than cognitive aim should not be thought of as
involving a devaluation of the field. For Bunge, for example,
the pure and applied sciences stood side by side as distinct
modes of investigating the natural world. Both are knowledge-
producing endeavors, but they produce different sorts of knowl-
edge: knowledge about the world and knowledge of how the
former type of knowledge can be applied to concrete problems,
respectively [19]. Also, engineers and philosophers of tech-
nology have more recently pointed out that technological disci-
plines produce well-established knowledge and good explana-
tions too, albeit knowledge and explanations of a different sort
than is produced by the sciences [20,21].
The upshot of our discussion is simple: While at first glance the
question whether a field such as organic chemistry can be
counted as a science or as a different sort of endeavor, such as
technology, might be considered trivial or pointless, much
depends on how the question is conceived. Although an answer
to the question will not change the field in practice, it will affect
how organic chemists think of what they are doing: what it is
their field aims for, how it goes about realizing those aims, and
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how it relates to other academic disciplines. While our aim is
not to defend a particular answer to these questions, we want to
suggest that achieving more clarity about such issues should be
part and parcel of the professionalization of any academic. To
further the discussion among the community of chemists, we
have highlighted two ways these issues may be addressed.
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